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THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS*
ROBERT BATEY**
In Parham v. J.R.,1 a June 1979 decision of the United States
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "Most children, even
in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments con-
cerning many decisions .... Parents can and must make those
judgments."' 2 This remark includes both a statement of fact about
a child's capacity for making choices, and a normative judgment
derived from that factual assessment: parents must choose for the
* Several persons aided materially in the preparation of this article. Its central idea
evolved from a conversation with my friend and teacher, Charles H. Whitebread, who also
commented extensively on the article's first draft. Several of my colleagues at Stetson-Jon
W. Bruce (now at Vanderbilt), Mary Greenwood (now in private practice), Elvin C.
Lashbrooke, Jr. (now at Notre Dame), Thomas C. Marks, Jr., Howard L. Oleck (now
retired), and Michael I. Swygert-participated in a vigorous discussion of the article's thesis
at a faculty seminar; Elvin Lashbrooke and Mike Swygert were also kind enough to read
and criticize various drafts. I hasten to add that none of these persons bears any
responsibility for the ideas expressed in the article. In fact, I can say with some assurance
that each of them is in fundamental disagreement with at least some part of it.
This article is dedicated to my mother Anne Deeb Batey and to my late father Whit B.
Batey. Forced to deal with a contentious adolescent, they responded with generous love, and
with a respect for my choices that I am only now beginning fully to appreciate.
** Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law. B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
University of Virginia; LL.M., University of Illinois.
1. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
2. Id. at 603.
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child. Both the factual statement and the norm derived from it
long have been major tenets of Western jurisprudence. 3 This arti-
cle questions their validity.
With regard to adolescents-categorized as those minors four-
teen or older-the lack of decisionmaking capacity asserted by the
Chief Justice and assumed by Anglo-American law simply does not
exist. Part I of this article marshals scientific evidence showing
that, when presented with difficult problems of moral reasoning,
adolescents perform markedly better than younger children, and
roughly on a par with adults. If Chief Justice Burger's factual
statement is inaccurate as applied to adolescents, the legal norm
derived from the factual statement also must be faulty. Accord-
ingly, parents should not be allowed to make decisions for their
competent adolescent children. The ramifications of this conclu-
sion are explored in Part II of this article.
I
Evidence of the adolescent's capacity for moral reasoning has
been a byproduct of modern psychology's interest in cognitive de-
velopment, the process by which a child acquires the intellectual
skills of an adult.4 The attainment of skill at moral reasoning has
been one of the primary focuses of the study of cognitive
development.
Jean Piaget, the pioneer in the field of cognitive development,
postulated the existence of two stages of moral reasoning.5 At the
first stage, which Piaget labeled the state of "heteronomous moral-
ity," external forces dictated the child's moral choices; the child's
morality was a combination of the conceptions of good and bad
3. Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of
the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children ....
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions.
Id. at 602; see id. at 621 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("For centuries it has been a canon of the
common law that parents speak for their minor children.").
4. The author is indebted to Joan E. Hughes, B.S., Purdue University, Ph.D., University
of Maine, J.D., Stetson University, for her assistance in the preparation of Part I. Ms.
Hughes, however, bears no responsibility for any of the ideas expressed in this or any other
part of the article.
5. See generally J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (1965).
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behavior held by all individuals in positions to reward the child's
good conduct or to punish bad conduct. From this stage, Piaget
claimed, the child moved to the second stage of "autonomous mo-
rality," in which internalized concepts of right and wrong con-
trolled the child's moral choices. Piaget theorized that the child
developed a personal morality, and thus moved from first- to sec-
ond-stage moral reasoning, at about age twelve or thirteen.
Piaget's generalities were particularized by Lawrence Kohlberg,
who further divided Piaget's two stages into six stages.6 At
Kohlberg's first and second stages, the child's moral choices were
the product of his self-interested reaction to others; at stage one
the child chose out of fear of punishment, and at stage two the
child chose in hope of reward. At the third and fourth stages of
Kohlberg's developmental process, social conventions ruled the
child's moral choices-at stage three, the conventions of individu-
als immediately surrounding the child (the child's family or peer
group), and at stage four, the conventions of society as a whole. At
stages five and six moral reasoning had all the attributes of formal
ethics: acting from belief in a social contract characterized the fifth
stage, and action based on universal ethical principles marked the
sixth. According to Kohlberg, very few adults-and far fewer chil-
dren-reached the last two stages.7
In addition to further dividing Piaget's developmental stages,
Kohlberg developed a means for testing his theory.8 Kohlberg And
his associates assessed the moral reasoning stage of individuals by
asking them to react to a short story9 involving a single moral
6. See generally Kohlberg, The Development of Children's Orientation Toward a Moral
Order: L Sequence in the Development of Moral Thought, 6 VITA HUMANA 11 (1963).
7. See Kohlberg, The Implications of Moral Stages for Adult Education, 72 RELIGIOUS
EDUC. 183 (1977).
8. See R. BROWN & R. HERRNSTEIN, PSYCHOLOGY 310-12 (1973).
9. The following is typical of the stories used:
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was
one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that
a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive
to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to
make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the
drug. The sick woman's husband Heinz went to everyone he knew to borrow
the money, but he could only get together about $1000 which is half of what it
cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked the druggist to
sell it cheaper or let him pay later. The druggist said, "No, I discovered the
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choice. Although the experimenters asked each subject to indicate
his approval or disapproval of the moral choice made in the story,
the subject's stage of moral reasoning was determined not by the
subject's answer, but by the reasons given by the subject for his
approval or disapproval. The experimenter, armed with paradig-
matic reasons for either opinion at all six stages,10 categorized the
subject's response according to its similarity to one of the para-
digms. After questioning the subject about several stories, an as-
sessment of the subject's moral reasoning stage was made.
Although the experiments verified the descriptive utility of the
six stages of moral reasoning Kohlberg had outlined, Kohlberg
drew a far more sweeping conclusion from his data. According to
Kohlberg, a person progressed in moral reasoning upward from
stage one, never skipped a stage, and never fell below an attained
stage."" Kohlberg's claim of unvarying sequential development has
proved highly controversial, however, because the data supporting
it is ambiguous.1
2
drug and I'm going to make money from it." Heinz got desperate and broke
into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have
done that?
See note 8 supra.
10. Compare the paradigmatic disapproving response at stage one-
Heinz doesn't have any permission to take the drug. He can't just go and break
through a window or break the door down. He'd be a bad criminal doing all
that damage. The drug is worth a lot of money and stealing anything so expen-
sive would really be a big crime.
-with the disapproving response at stage four-"It's a natural thing for Heinz to want to
save his wife, but it's still always wrong to steal. You have to follow the rules regardless of
how you feel or regardless of special circumstances." Each of these responses has a coordi-
nate response of approval. The paradigmatic responses at the second stage show this result-
neutral feature of the stages:
PRO: Heinz isn't really doing any harm to the druggist and he can always pay
him back. If he doesn't want to lose his wife, he should take the drug because
it's the only thing that will work.
CON: The druggist isn't wrong or bad, he just wants to make a profit like
everyone else. That's what you're in business for, to make money. Business is
business.
See note 8 supra.
11. Since first asserting his theory of sequential development, Kohlberg has redesigned
his stages to accommodate potentially conflicting experimental data. See, e.g., Kohlberg &
Kramer, Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development, 12
HuM. Dav. 93 (1969) (suggesting a stage 4B, in which moral reasoning resembled that of the
second stage).
12. See generally R. BROWN & R. HERRNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 314-26.
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The controversy over Kohlberg's theory of sequential develop-
ment has sparked the interest of experimenters in the field and has
resulted in much data. Although the data have not proved or dis-
proved unvarying sequential development, the data have shed light
on an issue more relevant to the rights of adolescents: the age at
which most children acquire the moral reasoning capacity of
adults.
Characterizing reasoning as "adult" at stages three and
four-because the third stage marks the first appearance of an in-
ternalized morality and because few adults ever rise above the
fourth stage 14-the experimental results are remarkably consistent
in indicating the attainment of an adult's capacity for moral rea-
soning at the onset of adolescence, around the fourteenth year.
In an early study, Kohlberg assessed the moral reasoning stage
of four sets of children grouped according to age.14 Of the Age 7
group, ninety-four percent gave responses indicating moral thought
at stages one or two. Fifty-eight percent of the Age 10 group also
showed reasoning at these low levels. The Age 13 group, however,
scored much better: only twenty-two percent of the thirteen-year-
olds were reasoning at the first or second stages, and fully half of
the Age 13 group employed moral reasoning skills at stage four or
higher. The Age 16 group fared only slightly better than the thir-
teen-year-olds; about a sixth of the sixteen-year-olds showed a ca-
pacity for only first- or second-stage moral thought.
A later study by Kohlberg and an associate confirmed these ear-
lier results, at least for children in modern societies.15 Once again,
children were grouped by age and tested for the quality of their
moral thought, and again the experimenters noted a major differ-
ence between the Age 10 group and the Age 13 group. Of a sample
of urban middle-class ten-year-olds living in the United States,
only thirty-two percent indicated moral thought at stage three or
13. See Gibbs, Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Judgment: A Constructive Critique, 47 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 43 (1977).
14. Kohlberg, supra note 6. Kohlberg presented his results graphically; the figures used in
the text are therefore estimates.
15. Kohlberg & Gilligan, The Adolescent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a
Postconventional World, 100 DAEDALUS 1051 (1971). As in Kohlberg's earlier work, see note
14 supra, the data in this study appeared in graph form, so the percentages used here are
approximations.
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higher although sixty-eight percent of the thirteen-year-olds with
the same background displayed reasoning skills above stages one
and two. As in Kohlberg's earlier study, the sixteen-year-old urban
middle-class Americans scored marginally higher than the Age 13
group, with seventy-eight percent showing at least third-stage
moral reasoning.
This later study is unique because Kohlberg and his associate
also measured the moral reasoning aptitude of children from
outside the United States. In addition to urban middle-class Amer-
icans, Kohlberg and his associate tested urban middle-class chil-
dren in Taiwan, as well as children from isolated villages in Turkey
and the Yucatan. The Taiwanese experiment showed the same
trends as the American study. At age ten, seventy percent of the
children were reasoning at stages one or two; at age thirteen, only
thirty-seven percent were reasoning at those levels; at age sixteen,
only twenty percent. The nonurban, non-middle-class children- of
Turkey and of the Yucatan, however, produced substantially dif-
ferent results. In the tests conducted in Turkey and the Yucatan,
the onset of adolescence produced no major change in moral devel-
opment. Sixty-two percent of the thirteen-year old Turks were still
reasoning at stages one and two, and seventy percent of the Age 13
Yucatan group used reasoning characteristic of those stages. Even
at age sixteen, over half of the children from each isolated vil-
lage-fifty-eight percent of the Turkish sample and fifty-one per-
cent of the Yucatan sample-displayed a capacity only for first- or
second-stage moral thought. These results support the unsurpris-
ing conclusion that life in a modern society forces adolescents to
rapidly develop skill at moral reasoning.
Other experimenters have noted the significance of the onset of
adolescence in the moral development of children in a contempo-
rary society. A 1976 study employed age groups broader and more
nearly "contiguous" than those used by Kohlberg.16 One set of
children tested ranged in age from 10.1 to 12.3 years; another, from
12.2 to 14.6; and a third, from 15.1 to 17.7. The experimenter
16. Turiel, A Comparative Analysis of Moral Knowledge and Moral Judgment in Males
and Females, 44 J. PERSONALITY 195 (1976). Turiel concluded that girls reason at a slightly




found that forty-seven percent of the Age 10-12 group reasoned at
stages one and two; however, only thirty-six percent of the 12-14
group displayed such a relatively low capacity for moral thought.
Considering the slight difference in age between the two sets of
children, the eleven percent difference in those reasoning at stage
one or two is significant. The Age 15-17 group bettered the results
of the Age 12-14 group by only eight percent-twenty-eight per-
cent of the older group employed reasoning characteristic of the
first or second stage-even though the 15-17 group included some
relatively old, and presumably quite mature, children.
One other study is noteworthy if only because of its sponsorship
by the American Bar Foundation. 7 The study associated
Kohlberg's stages with various attitudes toward law. Stages one
and two were labeled "law obeying," stages three and four "law
maintaining," and stages five and six "law making." Consistent
with other results in the area, the experimenters found a shift from
a law-obeying attitude to a law-maintaining one sometime during
the onset of adolescence. Specifically, the ten-year-olds tested
manifested predominantly stage-one moral reasoning, whereas the
thirteen-year-olds primarily employed stage-three reasoning. The
sixteen-year-olds tested most often displayed moral thought char-
acteristic of Kohlberg's fourth stage.
Each of these studies indicates that most adolescents, unlike
most preadolescent children, possess the moral reasoning skills of
adults. The traditional view of the law, however, reflected in Chief
Justice Burger's comment in Parham v. J.R., is that a person does
not acquire the skills of moral choice until the end of adolescence.
Thus, as a factual statement about the capacities of a large major-
ity of adolescents in modern society, the traditional view simply is
wrong.
The law's traditional judgment of incapacity is accurate, of
course, as applied to some adolescents. One study utilizing
Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning"' indicated that adolescents
17. Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, 27 J. Soc. IssuEs 65
(No. 2, 1971). See also Tapp & Levine, Persuasion to Virtue, 4 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 565
(1970).
18. Jurkovic & Prentice, Relation of Moral and Cognitive Development to Dimensions of
Juvenile Deliquency, 86 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 414 (1977). The average age of the children
tested was 15.68 years.
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properly labeled psychopathic, neurotic, or influenced by a deviant
subculture reasoned at stage three or higher relatively infre-
quently. Nonetheless, the question remains: are the incapacities of
some adequate reason to deny the rights of all?
II
From the assumption that adolescents lack the capacity to make
moral choices affecting their own lives, Anglo-American jurispru-
dence has drawn the conclusion that the adolescent's parents have
the right to make those choices. The conclusion that parents have
the right to make the adolescent's moral choices must be rejected,
however, because, as studies indicate, the law's underlying assump-
tion that adolescents lack the capacity to make moral choices is
incorrect. Because a large majority of adolescents do have the
moral reasoning capacities of adults, the law should accord the
considered choices of competent adolescents the same treatment it
accords similar choices of adults. Section A of this part discusses
the limited extent to which courts and legislatures already have
adopted the view that competent minors should have the right to
make moral decisions. Section B indicates what a thoroughgoing
implementation of this principle would entail, and Section C de-
scribes some of the principle's limits.
A
Despite the traditional view that parents or some surrogate like
the state must make decisions for adolescent children, isolated ex-
ceptions to this rule do exist. In the family law area, some legisla-
tures have recognized the right of an adolescent to refuse to con-
sent to adoption,19 and in divorce cases some courts have given
great weight to an older child's preference between parents where
child custody is contested.20
In the context of constitutional law, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized the adolescent's right to choose in one regard.
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,21 a major issue was whether
19. See UNIFORM ADOPTION AcT § 5(a)(5) (adopted in Montana, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, and Oklahoma).
20. See, e.g., Barton v. Barton, 230 Cal. App. 2d 43, 40 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1964).
21. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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Missouri constitutionally could limit an unmarried minor's right to
an abortion by requiring the consent of at least one of her parents.
A five-man majority of the Supreme Court resolved this dispute in
favor of the pregnant minor.
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Planned
Parenthood determined that "the State does not have the consti-
tutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly
arbitrary, veto over the decision" to abort.22 Although "safeguard-
ing... the family unit and... parental authority"2 3 was a legiti-
mate legislative end, pursuing this end could not justify infringe-
ment of "the right of privacy of the competent minor mature
enough to have become pregnant. ' 24 Thus, the Court in Planned
Parenthood implicitly recognized the right of a competent adoles-
cent to make important moral choices regardless of the desires of
the adolescent's parents.
The Court in Planned Parenthood noted that sexual maturity of
the adolescent did not indicate necessarily that the adolescent was
competent to exercise the right to an aborton, 25 as emphasized by
the Court's first decision in Bellotti v. Baird,26 the companion case
to Planned Parenthood. In Bellotti a unanimous Court ruled that
the federal judges who struck down Massachusetts' parental con-
sent provision should have abstained in order to allow the state
courts to interpret the provision in a way that might avoid the con-
stitutional issue faced in Planned Parenthood.27 Representatives
of the state argued that the Massachusetts provision could be in-
terpreted to require either parental consent or a judicial determi-
nation that the minor was mature enough to give competent con-
sent.28 Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Bellotti
strongly implied that the provision would be constitutional if inter-
preted in this way.29
22. Id. at 74.
23. Id. at 75.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
27. Id. at 146-48.
28. Id. at 144-45. A third option, judicial consent to the abortion, also wa offered as a
possible means of satisfying the provision's requirements. Id. at 145.
29. "[S]uch an interpretation would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitu-
tional challenge to the statute." Id. at 148. In Planned Parenthood, concurring Justices
1982]
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Reading Planned Parenthood and Bellotti together indicates
that if an adolescent seeks an abortion over the objections of her
parents, the state may bar the operation only after first determin-
ing that the adolescent is not sufficiently competent to make the
decision to abort. Thus, the adolescent's assertion of right is con-
trolling if the adolescent is competent, regardless of the desires of
the parent.3 0
The extent of the divergence between this conclusion regarding
the rights of competent adolescents and prevailing notions about
the rights of adolescents is emphasized by the dissenting opinions
in Planned Parenthood. Justice Stevens, after noting the many re-
straints on freedom of action that states impose in order to protect
children,31 indicated his belief that Missouri's parental consent re-
quirement was just another example of such restraints.32 Moreover,
Justice Stevens asserted, the majority in Planned Parenthood had
recognized the need for restraint if the pregnant minor was not
competent to make the abortion decision herself. Given this ac-
knowledgment, the legislature's choice of chronological age as the
basis for determining competence, although "imprecise and per-
haps even unjust in particular cases," was not unconstitutional. 3
Stewart and Powell expressed a similar opinion. 428 U.S. at 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring).
30. Developments after remand in Bellotti v. Baird support this reading of the Supreme
Court's decisions. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the statutory
provision in question allowed a court to bar an abortion even if "the minor is capable of
making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion." Baird v.
Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N.E.2d 288, 293 (1977). The federal district court,
responding to this interpretation of the statutory provision, reinstated its judgment that the
statute was unconstitutional, Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978), and the
Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of Planned Parenthood. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In the
Supreme Court's second decision in Bellotti v. Baird, four Justices indicated specifically
that an abortion statute for minors that required parental (or judicial) consent would be
constitutional if the consent requirement recognized an exception for competent pregnant
minors. Id. at 642-44 (plurality opinion).
The Court's opinion in H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981), upholding a Utah statute
requiring parental notification prior to a minor's abortion, reserved dedision on whether the
Constitution forbade application of this requirement to competent minors. Id. at 1169 ("We
cannot assume that the statute, when challenged in a proper case, will not be construed...
to exempt demonstrably mature minors."). Three members of the Court were prepared to
reach this issue and would have invalidated the statute for its failure to exempt competent
pregnant minors. Id. at 1192-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. 428 U.S. at 102 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 103.
33. Id. at 104-05.
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Justice White made similar arguments in his dissenting opinion
and highlighted the use of chronological age as "the traditional
way by which States have sought to protect children from their
own immature and improvident decisions. '34
The Court's decision in Planned Parenthhood is significant be-
cause it is such an anomaly. Even among recent constitutional de-
cisions, Planned Parenthood denotes the exception rather than the
rule with regard to adolescents' rights to make choices. 5 Given the
evidence supporting the typical adolescent's skill at making moral
choices, the principle underlying Planned Parenthood-that a
competent adolescent has the right to make decisions for her-
self-should be applied more frequently. The following section in-
dicates the legal changes that consistent application of this princi-
ple would achieve.
B
The thesis of this article can be stated simply: the law should
accord the considered choices of competent adolescents the same
treatment it accords similar choices of adults. Another way of
phrasing the same principle is that in a situation in which the state
would defer to the desires of an adult, the state can refuse to defer
to the considered desires of an adolescent only upon a showing
that the adolescent is not competent to make the decision.
The principle will change the current legal treatment of adoles-
cents in two ways. First, adoption of this principle as a guideline
for legal action will reduce drastically situations in which parents
34. Id. at 95 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. In Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), plaintiffs challenged a New
York statute prohibiting access by minors to contraceptives. Four Justices would have up-
held the challenge on the basis of Planned Parenthood. Id. at 691-99 (plurality opinion).
However, the fifth and sixth votes against the statute, Justices Powell and Stevens, refused
to rely on Planned Parenthood, instead finding the statute unconstitutional largely because
it prevented a parent from giving contraceptives to his child. Id. at 707-10 (Powell, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 713-16 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
More recently, in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), minors challenged a Georgia stat-
ute that allowed parents to commit their children to state mental institutions without any
prior hearing. Despite the dissent's protest that the case was controlled by Planned
Parenthood, id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Court distinguished the 1976 case, id.
at 604, and upheld the statute.
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may enlist the assistance of the state in controlling adolescent chil-
dren. Parent-induced state intervention in the life of an adolescent
will be appropriate only if the parents can demonstrate the adoles-
cent's inability to make an adult decision. Second, adhering to this
principle will expand greatly circumstances in which an adolescent
may obtain state assistance in enforcing his choice over the objec-
tions of his parents. If the adolescent can establish competence to
make the choice involved, the choice will be effective, regardless of
the parents' wishes and regardless of whether the adolescent is
seeking to block or force parental action.
The first consequence of a full recognition of the adolescent's
right to decide is virtually self-evident. If an adolescent is compe-
tent to choose, at the very least his making a given choice should
not be a ground for state intervention in his life-unless, of course,
he chooses to do something that is a ground for state intervention
in anyone's life, such as committing a crime. Unfortunately, the
state now frequently intervenes, even though the adolescent has
done nothing criminal; the basis for the intervention is typically a
claim by the adolescent's parents that the child is beyond their
control.36
State intervention in the life of an adolescent solely because his
parents disapprove of choices the adolescent has made should be
tolerated only if the adolescent is not capable of making mature
choices. If the minor is competent to make the decisions, the par-
ents' opposition to his chosen course, no matter how vigorous,
should not be a ground for state action.
This limitation on state intervention can be better assessed in a
concrete setting, such as that of a sexually active adolescent with
disapproving parents.3 7 For adolescent women, sexual activity is
frequently the ground used to justify the finding that the adoles-
36. Virtually every American jurisdiction allows its courts to discipline juveniles who are
either "beyond [parental] control" (28 states), "ungovernable" (24 jurisdictions), "incorrigi-
ble" (9 states), or "habitually disobedient" (31 jurisdictions). IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, app. A (Tent.
Draft 1977).
37. This context is suggested by Justice Stevens' query in Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (considering minors' rights of access to contraceptives), whether "a
minor has the ... right to put contraceptives to their intended use, notwithstanding the
combined objection of both parents." Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment); see note 35 supra.
374 [Vol. 23:363
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cent is beyond parental control.8
Adoption of the principle that the state should intervene only if
parents can establish the immaturity of their child's choice would
alter radically any judicial inquiry instituted by parents who allege
that their sexually precocious adolescent daughter is beyond their
control. No longer could a judicial inquiry be based on the parents'
showing that the daughter's sexual activity contradicted her par-
ents' commands; the parents would have to demonstrate that the
adolescent was not capable of making the moral decisions implicit
in her conduct.
Although the fact of disobedience alone would not justify state
intervention, the adolescent's disobedience would be helpful in
demonstrating the adolescent's incapacity to decide because the
disobedience would indicate a lack of concern for the moral norms
of individuals apparently closest to the adolescent, her family. The
implication of such disobedience would be that the daughter chose
to become sexually active simply because the behavior was pleasur-
able, with no regard for social conventions about such activity. 9
To rebut this and other evidence of immature decisionmaking,
the adolescent could testify to the process of thought that led her
to decide to engage in sexual activity. If that thought process goes
beyond pure self-interest-that is, if the adolescent relied in sub-
stantial part on the moral conventions of some entity-then her
disobedience should not be a ground for judicial intervention. The
entity providing the moral norms relied upon by the adolescent
could be the daughter's peer group or the society as a whole.40 In
either case, the adolescent's disobedience would indicate only nor-
38. [The] assistant commonwealth attorney... was using those terms "incorrigi-
ble," "wayward," "curfew breaker" and "beyond parental control," that, when
applied to a young girl, mean simply "she fucks." As late as 1960, the large
majority of juvenile females behind bars were there because they had acquired
an early taste for sexual intercourse.
T. ROBBINS, EVEN COWGIRLS GET THE BLUES 46 (1974). For an updated, but similar, assess-
ment in one jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318, 326 & n.6 (W.
Va. 1977).
39. This type of moral reasoning would fall into Kohlberg's second stage, a level below
that usually attained by adults. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra. One wonders,
however, how many adults conduct their own sexual behavior on the basis of similarly
"childish" reasoning.
40. Reasoning in these fashions would correspond to Kohlberg's third and fourth stages,
respectively. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
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mal progress in the development of moral reasoning, which hardly
should be a reason for state intervention.
If the courts are to retain any power to interfere in an adoles-
cent's life when her parents insist that the adolescent is beyond
their control,4' the only permissible basis for interference should
be a showing that the adolescent's disobedient behavior was the
result of immature moral reasoning. This should be true regardless
of the nature of the disobedient behavior.
Recognizing the rights of competent adolescents will not only
mean that parents can utilize the powers of the state against their
children less frequently; this recognition will also mean that ado-
lescent children can use these same powers against their parents
more frequently. If parents override the decision of their compe-
tent adolescent child, the adolescent should be able to obtain court
assistance in effectuating his choice.
Again, a concrete setting is helpful: the parents of an adolescent
boy commit him to a mental health institution over the boy's ob-
jections.42 Local studies suggest that many children committed by
their parents do not need institutionalized treatment 3 but have
been "dumped" in mental health facilities nonetheless. Thus, the
question arises whether the adolescent can secure his release
against the desires of his parents.
Under the traditional notion that the parents speak for the
child, the adolescent's complaint can be ignored; at best, the ado-
lescent can obtain his release only by showing that he does not
need the treatment he is receiving.44 In contrast, a voluntarily com-
41. The Juvenile Justice Standards Project, a joint effort of the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration and the American Bar Association, recommends outright abolition of the
courts' beyond-parental-control jurisdiction over children. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 1.1 (Tent. Draft 1977).
42. This situation is derived from Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), which considered
the voluntary commitment of children and made specific reference to the availability of
habeas corpus relief for the child. Id. at 616 n.22; see note 35 supra. •
43. The National Institute of Mental Health recently found that only 36% of pa-
tients below age 20 who were confined at St. Elizabeth's Hospital [in Washing-
ton, D.C.] actually required such hospitalization .... [A] Georgia Study
Commission on Mental Health Services for Children and Youth concluded that
more than half of the state's institutionalized children were not in need of con-
finement if other forms of care were made available.
442 U.S. at 634 n.21 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. According to Chief Justice Burger, some 30 jurisdictions oblige the state to release a
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mitted adult can obtain his release simply by requesting it."'
Fidelity to the principle that most adolescents can exercise their
rights with as much responsibility as adults would require a differ-
ent procedure. If an adolescent, voluntarily committed to a mental
health institution by his parents, seeks court assistance in ob-
taining a discharge, the court should order his release unless the
adolescent's parents can demonstrate that their child's choice is
not a competent one.
The parents' first step in demonstrating the adolescent's imma-
ture decisionmaking would be to explain their reasons for commit-
ting him. By detailing their son's mental history, the parents would
be offering evidence that any mature person in the adolescent's sit-
uation would have sought treatment, either to safeguard those
around him or to render his behavior more socially acceptable. 4 6
To counter the assertion that his choice for release is not a ma-
ture decision, the adolescent must'explain the reasoning behind his
choice. If the adolescent merely indicates that he does not like liv-
ing at the mental health facility, he has probably not made a ma-
ture decision.4 7 If, on the other hand, the adolescent does not con-
sider his allegedly deviant behavior a real threat to others or a
genuine departure from what is socially acceptable, and if he can
relate these opinions to the views of some social entity other than
himself, then the adolescent has in all likelihood made a compe-
tent decision." In the latter instance, the court should order the
adolescent released, even if it can be demonstrated that he could
voluntarily committed child no longer in need of institutionalized treatment, with or with-
out a request for release. Id. at 612-13 & n.20.
45. After such a request, the state may of course institute involuntary commitment
proceedings.
46. These reasons for voluntary commitment correspond to Kohlberg's third and fourth
stages of moral reasoning, respectively, and therefore qualify as "adult" thinking. See text
accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra.
47. This type of reasoning would fall into the second of Kohlberg's stages, a level most
adults surpass. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra. Nonetheless, it would be interest-
ing to know how many adults who could profit from institutionalized treatment reject or
rescind voluntary commitment for just such a reason.
48. If an adolescent's opinions are derived from those of a peer group or from those of
American society in general, the opinions would indicate third- or fourth-stage moral rea-
soning, respectively. See text accompanying notes 6 & 7 supra. It is not surprising that
reasons both for and against release, see note 46 supra, can be generated at either stage. See
text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
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benefit from treatment in the mental health institution.
If parents can force decisions on adolescents, the courts should
provide some mechanism to enable competent adolescents to over-
turn those decisions. Similarly, if parents can veto decisions made
by their adolescent children, those children should be able to ob-
tain judicial assistance in overriding such vetoes, unless the par-
ents can demonstrate that the child did not make a mature choice.
Thus, if an adolescent desires to pursue a particular education but
his parents thwart that desire,49 the adolescent should be allowed
to take his complaint to court. The traditinal concept of the par-
ent-child relationship would tolerate such a lawsuit only if the par-
ents' refusal constituted nonsupport, a difficult showing for the ad-
olescent to make.50 Recognition of the adolescent's capacity for
adult moral reasoning, however, requires a different standard: the
court should enjoin the parents from interfering unless the parents
can establish that the adolescent has made an immature judgment.
As in the other settings discussed, the court proceeding in this
situation would focus first on the reasons given by the parents and
then on the reasoning of the adolescent. The parents would offer
an "adult" explanation for opposing the child's education plan to
show that the adolescent's motivations were "childish." The ado-
lescent would then seek to deny this assertion by offering "adult"
reasons for his choice. If satisfied that such reasons motivated the
adolescent, the court should enjoin the parents' obstructionism.51
49. This example derives from Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which the
Supreme Court upheld, on freedom of religion grounds, the right of Amish parents to re-
move their children from school in violation of Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance
law. In dissent, Justice Douglas noted that not all the children involved in the case had
expressed a desire not to attend school and determined that if a child wished to attend
school and was "mature enough to have that desire respected" then the state constitution-
ally could compel the parents to school the child. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
50. Early cases defined the support obligation as requiring that the child be pro-
vided with "necessaries"-usually construed to give the child a -claim only for
those items deemed essentials of living .... Most recent cases have expanded
the scope of the obligation ... to require parents to maintain the child in a
manner commensurate with the parents' means and station in life.
IJA-ABA JUVENILLE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO RIGHTS OF MI-
NORS 3.2, Commentary (Official Draft 1979).
51. Because the competence issue is analytically distinct from the question of the parents'
support obligation, an injunction against the parents would not necessarily oblige the par-
ents to pay for the adolescent's planned education. That question would be decided on the
basis of other factors. See note 50 supra.
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Although limiting the circumstances in which parents can mobil-
ize the courts against their children is a popular contemporary re-
form,52 expanding the opportunities for child-induced judicial in-
tervention is not. To proponents of the currently potent "family
autonomy" doctrine, which maintains that the family must remain
intact as a unit, coercive intervention at the behest of either parent
or child is wrong. The work of the Juvenile Justice Standards Pro-
ject with respect to the fact situation just discussed exemplifies
this trend toward nonintervention. 3
The Project, a joint undertaking of the Institute of Judicial Ad-
ministration and the American Bar Association, has promulgated
"Standards Relating to Rights of Minors." These standards enun-
ciate the parents' duty to support the child" and grant the child
the right to enforce this obligation in court.5 The commentary to
the standards, however, draws away from this last commitment,
citing the need for family autonomy. 56 Elsewhere, the commentary
suggests that courts should upset family autonomy at a child's re-
quest only "where the parents have in fact breached, or have come
close to breaching, societally acceptable minima as expressed in ju-
venile court neglect statutes. '57
Such hostility to all but the most necessary support actions dif-
fers markedly from the tone of this Article and is due to the fact
that the family autonomy doctrine is ill-suited to the problems
posed by an adolescent at odds with his parents. Maintaining fam-
ily autonomy may make a great deal of sense if the complaining
party is someone outside the family who champions the rights of
an infant family member; however, deferring to family privacy
52. See note 41 supra.
53. See IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 1.1 (Official Draft 1979) (speaking of "a strong presumption for parental au-
tonomy in child rearing").
54. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO RIGHTS OF
MINORS 3.1-.2 (Official Draft 1979) ("[s]uch support... as will permit the child to live in a
manner commensurate with [the parents'] means and with the style of life which the child
has previously been accorded").
55. Id. 3.3A.
56. Id. Commentary.
57. Id.; see IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2.1 (Official Draft 1979) (limiting neglect findings to cases of "physical
harm," "serious emotional damage," sexual abuse, refusal to provide medical treatment that
would prevent "serious physical harm," and solicitation to delinquency).
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makes no sense if the complainant is an adolescent with a demon-
strable ability to form and to voice mature opinions. In this latter
situation, courts should feel bound to treat the dispute as an argu-
ment between adults and to adjudicate the matter accordingly.
Anything less constitutes a denial of the adolescent's rights.
C
Limits must be placed on the idea that the choices of competent
adolescents should be treated like the choices of adults. Without
such limits, it might be difficult to regulate vendors of items such
as prophylactics, 5 who could otherwise argue persuasively against
any statute that restricted the access of competent adolescents to
birth control (and all adolescents are presumed competent). The
result would be that the vendor could deal with all adolescents re-
gardless of whether the adolescents were competent.59
This example is distinguishable from those previously dis-
cussed-and thus susceptible of a different resolution-because of
the different adolescent decisionmaking processes involved. In all
of the choices previously mentioned, a period of consideration is
forced upon the adolescent. Before an abortion, Planned
Parenthood requires discussion with a physician, 0 and Bellotti v.
Baird apparently permits required consultation with a court."' In a
beyond-parental-control hearing, a sexually active adolescent usu-
ally would be forced to justify her conduct,6 2 which would require
reflection on that conduct and a decision about whether she should
continue. In hearings to reverse parental actions or to overcome
parental obstacles, the adolescent typically would be required to
justify his choices.63 Thus, decisions like rejecting a voluntary com-
mitment or seeking further education would be well considered.
58. The problem is suggested by the facts in Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977), in which birth-control vendors challenged a New York statute prohibiting the distri-
bution of contraceptive devices to unmarried minors. Without agreeing on an opinion of the
Court, six Justices found the statute unconstitutional. See note 35 supra.
59. It can, of course, be argued that there is little harm in allowing the sale of prophylac-
tics to youths too immature to make competent judgments about their use. See text accom-
panying notes 68-70 infra.
60. 428 U.S. at 61 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)).
61. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra. See also note 35 supra.
62. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 47-48 & 51 supra.
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On the other hand, the adolescent's choice to purchase prophy-
lactics is unlikely to be the product of extended deliberation; thus,
little guarantees that the adolescent has considered the moral
dimensions of his decision. And, without such consideration, even
an adolescent capable of a competent choice may not choose
competently.
The work of Kohlberg and his followers considered the moral
reasoning capacity of children who had the time to reflect on moral
choices.64 Although this work does indicate the reasoning adoles-
cents use when considering choices in their own lives, it says little
about how adolescents make nonreflective decisions. Regarding
these nonreflective decisions, scant data exists from which to de-
termine whether an adolescent's spur-of-the-moment choice is
more like an adult's or more like a child's.6 5
This lack of data regarding nonreflective choices should not bar
completely the competent adolescent from enforcing his choices; he
merely should be required to take steps that indicate that his deci-
sion is the product of reflection. The seeking of state aid6 in ob-
taining access to birth-control devices would be such a step. Like
other invocations of the legal process, 67 seeking state aid would in-
dicate that the adolescent had engaged in some reflection prior to
seeking governmental assistance. The only ground on which the
state should refuse such assistance is a determination that the ado-
lescent's decision is not a competent one. The inquiry necessary to
determine competence also will force the adolescent to reflect.
This limit on the recognition of the rights of adolescents has not
been observed in the birth-control context: four Justices of the
United States Supreme Court, 8 as well as the Juvenile Justice
64. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra.
65. Brown and Herrnstein's text on psychology collects experimental data that suggest
that Kohlberg's analysis of moral reasoning is irrelevant in situations requiring quick deci-
sions. R. BROWN & R. HERRNSTMN, supra note 8, at 326-34.
66. At a minimum, the courts should be open to any adolescent desiring a declaration
(upon which a vendor could rely) that the adolescent's decision to purchase prophylactics is
a mature one. Because few adolescents would be willing to pursue such litigation, a state
would better serve the rights of adolescents if it offered such aid administratively. An
agency that thus responds to the needs of adolescents could also offer counseling and other
services..
67. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
68. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-99 (1977) (plurality opinion); see
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Standards Project, 9 have suggested that adolescents should have
unrestricted access to birth control. Of course, a state may grant
unlimited access for reasons other than the need to recognize the
rights of adolescents; 70 however, a state should at least give an ado-
lescent the right to make such a purchase if the adolescent shows
that he has considered his decision to purchase contraceptives, ab-
sent a showing that the adolescent is not competent to make the
decision involved.
The limits imposed by a requirement that the competent adoles-
cent must have considered his choice are also apparent in the ap-
plication of this article's thesis to the question of adolescent access
to pornography.71 Unless the material is constitutionally ob-
scene-and therefore subject to a legislative determination that no
one, whether adult or adolescent, may have access to
it 72 -deference to the choices of competent adolescents would seem
to require that such adolescents have the same access to porno-
graphic materials as adults. Sellers of pornography could employ
such an argument to strike down laws prohibiting the sale of their
wares to adolescents; if the argument succeeded, the sellers could
then market their goods to all adolescents, regardless of whether
individual adolescents were in fact competent to purchase them,
because of the presumption that all adolescents are competent.
The flaw in this argument is that, although all adolescents
should be presumed competent, not all adolescent choices should
be presumed competent. Only those adolescent choices that have
been the subject of consideration should be eligible for the benefits
note 35 supra.
69. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO RIGHTS OF
MINORS 4.8 (Official Draft 1979).
70. See, e.g., id., Commentary ("The long range interests of the minor and the commu-
nity require legislation allowing a minor of any age to consent to medical services, therapy,
and counseling for the many problems associated with sexual activity including ... contra-
ception and birth control." (emphasis added)).
71. This question is suggested by Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), in which the
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a vendor of "girlie magazines," id. at 631, for sell-
ing such magazines to persons under the age of 17. Id. at 633. The Court in Ginsberg recog-
nized that "[t]he 'girlie' picture magazines involved in the sales here are not obscene for
adults." Id. at 634.
72. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 577
(1969) (private possession of obscenity may not be criminalized).
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of this presumption."5 The decision to purchase pornography is one
not likely to be carefully considered.
This does not mean that a state should be free to prohibit all
access by adolescents to pornography. If an adolescent can demon-
strate that he has considered his decision to purchase a particular
magazine or to see a particular film, the state may prohibit the
adolescent's access to the work only upon a showing of incompe-
tence to make the choice involved. Of course, very few adolescents
would be willing to undertake the burdens of establishing a consid-
ered choice to purchase pornography7 4 and of refuting a showing of
incompetence. Nevertheless, the law should leave this option open
to the determined adolescent and those determined to help him.75
M
Adolescence marks the end of a child's transition to adulthood,
to autonomous interaction in society. The law largely has ignored
this transitional process, adhering instead to the concept that
childhood is a legally disabling condition that vanishes completely
on the attainment of a certain birthday. This Article proposes
abandonment of this monolithic view of childhood, urging instead
a recognition that some children-those properly labeled adoles-
cents-are in most circumstances capable of making choices for
themselves. Experimental data support this conclusion regarding
adolescent decisionmaking and indicate that the considered
choices of competent adolescents are not appreciably inferior to
those of adults. Accordingly, the law should treat the choices of
both adults and adolescents similarly, honoring the decision of an
adolescent absent a showing either of incompetence to decide or of
a lack of reflection in the decisionmaking process.
Adoption of this principle would dramatically affect the law's at-
titude toward the parent-child relationship by partially emancipat-
73. See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 supra.
74. To show a considered choice, the adolescents would have to petition some government
entity, either a court or a state agency. See note 66 supra. The act of petitioning would
demonstrate reflection on the choice the adolescent is seeking to enforce. See text accompa-
nying notes 66 & 67 supra.
75. The adolescent committed to pressing such a claim might well find support in an
organization devoted to protection of civil liberties, or in an agency whose mission is to
provide legal services to the indigent.
19821
384 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:363
ing the adolescent. Thus, the legal aspects of adolescence would
match the psychological aspects of adolescence by denoting the
end of the transition to adulthood.
